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Single Idea 3212

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs ]

Full Idea

Beliefs are maps by which we steer.

Gist of Idea

Beliefs are maps by which we steer

Source

Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.259 n5

Book Ref

Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.259


The 23 ideas from Frank P. Ramsey

"It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey]
Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey]
Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey]
Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey]
Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey]
Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey]
Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson]
'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey]
We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey]
The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling]
Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey]