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Single Idea 3223
[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
]
Full Idea
It is tempting to think that if a system has concepts for nested intentionality and first-person reflection, it has all that's needed for self-consciousness.
Gist of Idea
Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.2.2)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.292
A Reaction
If there nothing more than nested intentionality in complex minds like ours, the top level of the nesting would still have a special status. And if the top level always seemed to stay the same while the lower levels changed, I'd probably call it the Self
The
60 ideas
from 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind'
3136
|
The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism
[Rey]
|
3137
|
Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars
[Rey]
|
3138
|
Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia
[Rey]
|
3139
|
Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred)
[Rey]
|
3140
|
If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it
[Rey]
|
3213
|
Animals may also use a language of thought
[Rey]
|
3215
|
Images can't replace computation, as they need it
[Rey]
|
3216
|
Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker?
[Rey]
|
3220
|
Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part
[Rey]
|
3221
|
Our desires become important when we have desires about desires
[Rey]
|
3223
|
Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality
[Rey]
|
3224
|
If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental
[Rey]
|
3227
|
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude?
[Rey]
|
3226
|
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind?
[Rey]
|
3229
|
If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion
[Rey]
|
3141
|
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex?
[Rey]
|
3142
|
Why qualia, and why this particular quale?
[Rey]
|
3143
|
Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic
[Rey]
|
3145
|
The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds
[Rey]
|
3147
|
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
[Rey]
|
3148
|
Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach
[Rey]
|
3149
|
Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta')
[Rey]
|
3150
|
Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience?
[Rey]
|
3162
|
Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives
[Rey]
|
3163
|
Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious
[Rey]
|
3164
|
Intentional explanations are always circular
[Rey]
|
3165
|
Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological
[Rey]
|
3166
|
Animal learning is separate from their behaviour
[Rey]
|
3167
|
Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment
[Rey]
|
3170
|
We train children in truth, not in grammar
[Rey]
|
3169
|
A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then'
[Rey]
|
3171
|
Children speak 90% good grammar
[Rey]
|
3175
|
Animals map things over time as well as over space
[Rey]
|
3172
|
Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge
[Rey]
|
3173
|
How are stimuli and responses 'similar'?
[Rey]
|
3176
|
Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one
[Rey]
|
3174
|
Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli
[Rey]
|
3179
|
Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind
[Rey]
|
3180
|
Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group
[Rey]
|
3181
|
A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be
[Rey]
|
3186
|
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind?
[Rey]
|
3188
|
Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes
[Rey]
|
3194
|
CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason
[Rey]
|
3196
|
Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will
[Rey]
|
3195
|
If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will'
[Rey]
|
3199
|
Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes
[Rey]
|
3201
|
Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation'
[Rey]
|
3202
|
Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well
[Rey]
|
3200
|
Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism
[Rey]
|
3204
|
The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal"
[Rey]
|
3205
|
Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts
[Rey]
|
3206
|
One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
[Rey]
|
3207
|
Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object
[Rey]
|
3209
|
Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers
[Rey]
|
3210
|
If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning
[Rey]
|
3129
|
Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance
[Rey]
|
3128
|
It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere
[Rey]
|
3127
|
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research
[Rey]
|
3134
|
Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain
[Rey]
|
3232
|
Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned
[Rey]
|