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Full Idea
Brentano's thesis is that all mental phenomena are intentional i.e. representational. Support for this view is that assimilating phenomenal experience to attitudes we explain the essential unity of the mind.
Gist of Idea
Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect
Source
report of Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.5
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.301
A Reaction
Unifying intentionality and qualia in a single theory looks like a good move, but which one has priority? Evolutionary theory says priority goes to whatever produces behaviour. My intuition is that qualia are more basic - in tiny insects, say.
| 3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |