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Full Idea
Phenomenal objects and properties are no more needed to explain the workings of our mind than are angels needed to explain the motion of the planets.
Gist of Idea
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind?
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.6.1)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.307
A Reaction
The question would be whether 'phenomenal properties' contained unique information, which could therefore influence behaviour. It is also a matter of exactly what you are trying to explain.
| 12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
| 7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| 2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
| 7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
| 7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
| 3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |