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Full Idea
Qualitative experience is just a particular species of propositional attitude.
Gist of Idea
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude?
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.6.1)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.308
A Reaction
This sounds very implausible. If I hear a loud and baffling noise, is a proposition instantly involved? When a subtle change of colour occurs in the sky at sunset, is that 'propositional'? Do slugs formulate propositions when they taste garlic?
3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |