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Single Idea 3239
[filed under theme 16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
]
Full Idea
If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
Clarification
A token is an item; a type is a set of characteristics
Gist of Idea
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type
Source
Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
Book Ref
Williams,Bernard: 'Problems of the Self: Papers 1956-1972' [CUP 1979], p.81
A Reaction
Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?
The
65 ideas
from Bernard Williams
22454
|
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order)
[Williams,B, by Foot]
|
22407
|
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity
[Williams,B]
|
22410
|
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd
[Williams,B]
|
22408
|
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared
[Williams,B]
|
22411
|
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one
[Williams,B]
|
22409
|
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty
[Williams,B]
|
4113
|
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty'
[Williams,B]
|
4110
|
Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future
[Williams,B]
|
4112
|
A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires
[Williams,B]
|
4114
|
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple
[Williams,B]
|
4116
|
A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power
[Williams,B]
|
4121
|
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws?
[Williams,B]
|
4122
|
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests
[Williams,B]
|
4120
|
It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act
[Williams,B]
|
4124
|
Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law
[Williams,B]
|
4131
|
Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character
[Williams,B]
|
4133
|
Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one
[Williams,B]
|
4132
|
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees
[Williams,B]
|
4128
|
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting
[Williams,B]
|
4134
|
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels"
[Williams,B]
|
4135
|
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values
[Williams,B]
|
4243
|
Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries
[Williams,B]
|
4244
|
It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism
[Williams,B]
|
4247
|
It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children
[Williams,B]
|
4245
|
Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions
[Williams,B]
|
4246
|
Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide
[Williams,B]
|
4252
|
Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked
[Williams,B]
|
4249
|
"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation
[Williams,B]
|
4248
|
Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done
[Williams,B]
|
4250
|
The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent
[Williams,B]
|
22355
|
In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible
[Williams,B]
|
22453
|
Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts
[Williams,B, by Foot]
|
22455
|
Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon
[Williams,B]
|
20168
|
Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified
[Williams,B]
|
20167
|
Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations
[Williams,B]
|
3233
|
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs
[Williams,B]
|
3234
|
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view
[Williams,B]
|
3235
|
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight
[Williams,B]
|
3236
|
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society
[Williams,B]
|
9284
|
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise
[Williams,B]
|
23282
|
If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant
[Williams,B]
|
24007
|
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions
[Williams,B]
|
24008
|
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions
[Williams,B]
|
24009
|
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things
[Williams,B]
|
24010
|
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses
[Williams,B]
|
24012
|
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness
[Williams,B]
|
23278
|
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them
[Williams,B]
|
23279
|
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves'
[Williams,B]
|
23280
|
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character
[Williams,B]
|
7946
|
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things
[Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
|
3238
|
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague
[Williams,B]
|
3239
|
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type
[Williams,B]
|
23283
|
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first
[Williams,B]
|
4317
|
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded
[Williams,B, by Cottingham]
|
2169
|
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status
[Williams,B]
|
2172
|
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece
[Williams,B]
|
2174
|
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event
[Williams,B]
|
2176
|
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened
[Williams,B]
|
2175
|
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good
[Williams,B]
|
2180
|
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice
[Williams,B]
|
2178
|
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent
[Williams,B]
|
2179
|
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives
[Williams,B]
|
2181
|
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide
[Williams,B]
|
22450
|
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true
[Williams,B, by Foot]
|
4366
|
We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific
[Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
|