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Single Idea 3246

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness ]

Full Idea

It is hard to think of myself as being identical with my brain. If my brain is to be split, with one half miserable and the other half euphoric, my expectations can take no form, as my idea of myself doesn't allow for divisibility.

Gist of Idea

I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two

Source

Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], III.4)

Book Ref

Nagel,Thomas: 'The View from Nowhere' [OUP 1989], p.45


A Reaction

Nagel is trying to imply that there is some sort of conceptual impossibility here, but it may just be very difficult. I can think about my lovely lunch while doing my miserable job. Does Nagel want to hang on to a unified thing which doesn't exist?


The 5 ideas with the same theme [problems with the possibility of dividing consciousness or brain]:

If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]