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Single Idea 3247

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification ]

Full Idea

The central problem of epistemology is what to believe and how to justify one's beliefs, not the impersonal problem of whether my beliefs can be said to be knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge

Source

Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.1)

Book Ref

Nagel,Thomas: 'The View from Nowhere' [OUP 1989], p.69

A Reaction

Wrong. The question of whether what one has is 'knowledge' is not impersonal at all - it is having the social status of a knower or expert.

The 24 ideas from 'The View from Nowhere'

3240 There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel]
3242 Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel]
3241 It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel]
22429 We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
3244 Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
3245 The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
3246 I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
20989 Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
22354 Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
3248 Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
3247 Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
3249 Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
3251 Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
3252 Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
3254 If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
3255 We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
3256 Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
3257 Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
3258 If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
3261 Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
3262 Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
3264 We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
3263 If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
3265 We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]