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Single Idea 3251
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
]
Full Idea
Observed regularities provide reason to believe that they will be repeated only to the extent that they provide evidence of hidden necessary connections, which hold timelessly.
Gist of Idea
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity
Source
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.5)
Book Ref
Nagel,Thomas: 'The View from Nowhere' [OUP 1989], p.84
The
12 ideas
with the same theme
[role of pure reason in inductive inference]:
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3033
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Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents
[Diog. Laertius]
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6350
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Premises can support an argument without entailing it
[Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
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3598
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Hume just shows induction isn't deduction
[Williams,M on Hume]
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13055
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Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence
[Salmon]
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3860
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Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected
[Newton-Smith on Popper]
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6953
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All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication
[Harman]
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3251
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Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity
[Nagel]
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16800
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An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition
[Lipton]
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16858
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We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction
[Lipton]
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4811
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Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises
[Psillos]
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4583
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How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction?
[Baggini /Fosl]
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14914
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Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular
[Ladyman/Ross]
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