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Single Idea 3256
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
]
Full Idea
The objective badness of pain is not some mysterious further property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason for anyone capable of viewing the world objectively to want it to stop.
Gist of Idea
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance
Source
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.2)
Book Ref
Nagel,Thomas: 'The View from Nowhere' [OUP 1989], p.144
A Reaction
Presumably all pains (e.g. of grief and of toothache) have something in common, to qualify as pains. It must be more than being disliked, because we can dislike a food.
The
63 ideas
from Thomas Nagel
3268
|
If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one
[Nagel]
|
3269
|
If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful
[Nagel]
|
3270
|
Justifications come to an end when we want them to
[Nagel]
|
4883
|
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything
[Dennett on Nagel]
|
4989
|
Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like'
[Kirk,R on Nagel]
|
3286
|
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism
[Nagel]
|
3287
|
We can't be objective about experience
[Nagel]
|
3288
|
Can we describe our experiences to zombies?
[Nagel]
|
2957
|
Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing
[Nagel, by Lockwood]
|
3285
|
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it
[Nagel]
|
6479
|
Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does
[Nagel]
|
6446
|
In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity
[Nagel]
|
6447
|
Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint
[Nagel]
|
6448
|
A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial
[Nagel]
|
6477
|
I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it
[Nagel]
|
6450
|
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives
[Nagel]
|
6478
|
Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority
[Nagel]
|
3273
|
Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic
[Nagel]
|
3275
|
Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights
[Nagel]
|
3274
|
Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights
[Nagel]
|
3276
|
A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties
[Nagel]
|
3277
|
In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual?
[Nagel]
|
3278
|
An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life
[Nagel]
|
3281
|
The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality
[Nagel]
|
3282
|
The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes
[Nagel]
|
3284
|
There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe)
[Nagel]
|
1490
|
You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture
[Nagel]
|
3271
|
We can't control our own beliefs
[Nagel]
|
3272
|
Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome
[Nagel]
|
3290
|
Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat
[Nagel]
|
3291
|
Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels
[Nagel]
|
1489
|
Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving
[Nagel]
|
4242
|
Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know
[Nagel]
|
3292
|
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is
[Nagel]
|
3293
|
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me
[Nagel]
|
3294
|
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view
[Nagel]
|
3295
|
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person
[Nagel]
|
3296
|
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective
[Nagel]
|
3242
|
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it
[Nagel]
|
3241
|
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds
[Nagel]
|
3240
|
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions
[Nagel]
|
22429
|
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities
[Nagel]
|
3244
|
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori
[Nagel]
|
3245
|
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity
[Nagel]
|
3246
|
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two
[Nagel]
|
20989
|
Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species
[Nagel]
|
22354
|
Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere'
[Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
|
3248
|
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective
[Nagel]
|
3247
|
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge
[Nagel]
|
3249
|
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
[Nagel]
|
3251
|
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity
[Nagel]
|
3252
|
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible
[Nagel]
|
3254
|
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory
[Nagel]
|
3255
|
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives
[Nagel]
|
3256
|
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance
[Nagel]
|
3257
|
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values
[Nagel]
|
3258
|
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties
[Nagel]
|
3261
|
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable
[Nagel]
|
3262
|
Utilitarianism is too demanding
[Nagel]
|
3264
|
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values
[Nagel]
|
3263
|
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning
[Nagel]
|
3265
|
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death
[Nagel]
|
4001
|
The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones
[Nagel]
|