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Single Idea 3285

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self ]

Full Idea

As a result of the evidence of split-brains, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, …but we may be unable to abandon the idea, no matter what we discover.

Gist of Idea

We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it

Source

Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971], p.164)

Book Ref

Nagel,Thomas: 'Mortal Questions' [CUP 1981], p.164

A Reaction

I'm not sure what grounds you can have for a claim that we can't abandon our current view of selves, even when the new reality will be utterly different. Rather conservative? I would expect future concepts to roughly match future reality.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [Self can be inferred to exist, rather than experienced]:

22528 The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
21317 Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
9751 To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
21450 Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
22060 The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
22066 Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
22016 The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
23243 Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
22073 The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
21225 The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
2940 The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
7109 If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
3285 We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
3293 If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
3244 Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
3245 The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
7385 People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
19650 The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]