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Full Idea
The goal of an objective phenomenology would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences.
Gist of Idea
Can we describe our experiences to zombies?
Source
Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974], p.179)
Book Ref
Nagel,Thomas: 'Mortal Questions' [CUP 1981], p.179
A Reaction
This seems a bizarre expectation. We can already explain visual experience to the blind up to a point, but no one is dreaming of an "objective phenomenology" which will give blind people total understanding, just by reading about it in braille.
| 12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |