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Single Idea 3302
[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
]
Full Idea
Quine has showed us how set theory - now recognised to be positively awash in Platonistic metaphysics - can and should be prevented from infecting logic proper.
Gist of Idea
Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic
Source
report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro
Book Ref
Benardete,José A.: 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' [OUP 1989], p.5
The
29 ideas
from 'works'
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15783
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Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist
[Lycan on Quine]
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15782
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Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia
[Quine, by Lycan]
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2796
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For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically
[Quine, by Dancy,J]
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8450
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Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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3868
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To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it
[Quine, by Newton-Smith]
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4713
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For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations
[Quine, by O'Grady]
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7330
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The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants
[Quine, by Miller,A]
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17862
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Essence gives an illusion of understanding
[Quine, by Almog]
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13736
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Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure
[Schaffer,J on Quine]
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3302
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Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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10211
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Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists
[Quine, by Shapiro]
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3336
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Two things can never entail three things
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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10793
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Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal
[Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
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8453
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If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers
[Quine]
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10311
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No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts
[Quine, by Hale]
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10538
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Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction
[Quine, by Dummett]
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3322
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Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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8467
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Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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8466
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For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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4712
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Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable'
[Quine, by O'Grady]
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16021
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Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology)
[Quine, by Noonan]
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10667
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A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible
[Quine, by Hossack]
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3325
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For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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8534
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Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications
[Quine, by Armstrong]
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6078
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Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties
[Quine, by McGinn]
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10295
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Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets
[Quine, by Shapiro]
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8479
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Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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3751
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Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true
[Quine, by Jacquette]
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7970
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Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist
[Quine, by Macdonald,C]
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