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Full Idea
Some mental phenomena - in particular, sensations like tickles and pains - do not seem to exhibit either reference or content.
Gist of Idea
Pain has no reference or content
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.21
A Reaction
This could be challenged. These sensations cannot be had without a bodily location, and they give information about possible contact or damage.
Related Idea
Idea 4089 Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
| 3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |