more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 3367
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
]
Full Idea
Mental states are not the only things which exhibit intentionality - words and sentences can also refer to or represent facts or states of affairs.
Gist of Idea
Both thought and language have intentionality
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 22)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.22
A Reaction
This points to Searle's distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'derived' intentionality (see Idea 3465). We must now explain the difference between verbal intentionality and non-verbal intentionality (both as phenomena, and as information).
Related Idea
Idea 3465
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[what exactly is intentionality?]:
|
3364
|
All mental phenomena contain an object
[Brentano]
|
|
7107
|
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness
[Sartre]
|
|
3465
|
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
[Searle]
|
|
3484
|
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
[Searle]
|
|
3489
|
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
[Searle]
|
|
3367
|
Both thought and language have intentionality
[Kim]
|
|
2485
|
Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
[Fodor]
|
|
15473
|
How does anything get outside itself?
[Fodor, by Martin,CB]
|
|
4993
|
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm
[Kirk,R]
|
|
11935
|
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness
[Molnar]
|
|
6543
|
Intentionality comes in degrees
[Lycan]
|
|
6481
|
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
[Robinson,H]
|
|
4087
|
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
|
4095
|
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
|
4623
|
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
[Heil]
|
|
4929
|
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input
[Edelman/Tononi]
|
|
15018
|
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics
[Sider]
|