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Single Idea 3375

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap ]

Full Idea

If an orange visual image is a brain state then, by the indiscernibility of identicals, some brain state must also be orange.

Gist of Idea

If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 64)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.64


A Reaction

I think this is the Hardest of all Hard Questions: how can I experience orange if my neurons haven't turned orange? What on earth is orangeness? I don't believe it is a 'microproperty' of orange objects; it's in us.


The 5 ideas with the same theme [no prospect of fully explaining mind via brain]:

Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]