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Full Idea
In order to make sense of the empirical character of mind-brain identity, we must acknowledge the existence of phenomenal properties.
Clarification
'Phenomenal properties' are raw experiences, like colour
Gist of Idea
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 66)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.66
A Reaction
Mind-brain identity is, of course, an ontological theory, not an epistemological one (like empiricism). I suspect that the basis for my belief in reductive physicalism is an intuition, which I am hoping is a rational intuition. Cf. Idea 3989.
Related Idea
Idea 3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
| 3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
| 3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
| 3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
| 3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
| 3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
| 3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |