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Full Idea
Functionalists take a "realist" approach to dispositions whereas the behaviourist embraces an "instrumentalist" line.
Clarification
'Instrumentalism' is the view that they are useful fictions, not real things
Gist of Idea
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 78)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.78
A Reaction
A helpful distinction, which immediately shows why functionalism is superior to behaviourism. There must be some explanation of mental dispositions, and the instrumental view is essentially a refusal to think about the real problem.
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
| 2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
| 4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
| 4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |