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Full Idea
If inverted qualia, or absent qualia (zombies), are possible in functionally equivalent systems, qualia are not capturable by functional definitions.
Gist of Idea
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.114)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.114
A Reaction
The point here (I take it) is that we don't have to go the whole hog of saying the qualia are therefore epiphenomenal, although that is implied. How about a fail-safe situation, where qualia do it for me, and something else does the same for zombies?
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
| 3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
| 3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
| 7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
| 3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |