more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Unless mental properties have causal powers, there would be little point in worrying about them.
Gist of Idea
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.118
A Reaction
This doesn't, on its own, actually rule out epiphenomenalism, but it does show why it barely qualifies as a serious theory. One might, in fact, say that we simply can't worry about something which has no causal powers. The powers might not be physical…
| 4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
| 3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
| 3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
| 3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
| 4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
| 7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
| 6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |