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Full Idea
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
Gist of Idea
Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless
Source
Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.129
A Reaction
An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
| 3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
| 3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
| 20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |