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Full Idea
If epiphenomenalism were true, it would be a mystery how such things could be known to us.
Gist of Idea
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.130)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.130
A Reaction
If a brain were asked whether it was conscious, it would presumably say 'yes', but (if epiphenomenalism were true) the cause of that would have to be brain events, and NOT information that it is conscious, which the brain could not have. Big objection.
| 3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
| 3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
| 20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |