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Single Idea 3412
[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
]
Full Idea
How do we know that we are angry rather than embarrassed?
Gist of Idea
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.159
A Reaction
A very nice question, because the only answer I (or anyone?) can think of is that they are distinguished by their content. Event A is annoying, while event B is embarrassing. Either of those feelings is almost inconceivable without its content.
The
108 ideas
from Jaegwon Kim
4781
|
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday')
[Kim, by Psillos]
|
8396
|
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation
[Kim, by Tooley]
|
8429
|
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation
[Kim]
|
8428
|
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals
[Kim]
|
8430
|
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories
[Kim]
|
3536
|
Supervenient properties must have matching base properties
[Kim]
|
3535
|
All observable causes are merely epiphenomena
[Kim]
|
10369
|
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated
[Kim, by Schaffer,J]
|
8974
|
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time
[Kim, by Simons]
|
8976
|
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract
[Simons on Kim]
|
8975
|
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements
[Kim, by Simons]
|
8977
|
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties
[Simons on Kim]
|
8980
|
Kim's theory results in too many events
[Simons on Kim]
|
4779
|
For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times
[Kim, by Psillos]
|
14470
|
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event
[Kim]
|
13314
|
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal
[Kim, by Seneca]
|
2308
|
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
[Kim]
|
2309
|
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
[Kim]
|
2310
|
Supervenience is linked to dependence
[Kim]
|
2311
|
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
[Kim]
|
2313
|
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
[Kim]
|
2314
|
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
[Kim]
|
2315
|
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
[Kim]
|
2317
|
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency
[Kim, by PG]
|
2318
|
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes
[Kim, by PG]
|
2319
|
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
[Kim]
|
2320
|
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
[Kim]
|
2322
|
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
[Kim]
|
2323
|
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia
[Kim]
|
2325
|
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
[Kim]
|
2324
|
Intentionality as function seems possible
[Kim]
|
2327
|
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
[Kim]
|
2328
|
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
[Kim]
|
2329
|
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
[Kim]
|
2065
|
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people
[Plato on Kim]
|
1550
|
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"?
[Plato on Kim]
|
530
|
There are two contradictory arguments about everything
[Kim]
|
8825
|
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data
[Kim]
|
3359
|
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation
[Kim]
|
3360
|
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate?
[Kim]
|
3362
|
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
[Kim]
|
3363
|
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing
[Kim]
|
3366
|
Pain has no reference or content
[Kim]
|
3365
|
Intentionality involves both reference and content
[Kim]
|
3367
|
Both thought and language have intentionality
[Kim]
|
3368
|
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect?
[Kim]
|
3369
|
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural
[Kim]
|
3370
|
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs?
[Kim]
|
3371
|
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together
[Kim]
|
3372
|
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states
[Kim]
|
3373
|
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us
[Kim]
|
3374
|
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
[Kim]
|
3375
|
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?
[Kim]
|
3376
|
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
|
3377
|
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
[Kim]
|
3379
|
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
[Kim]
|
3380
|
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
[Kim]
|
3382
|
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test
[Kim]
|
3383
|
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements
[Kim]
|
3384
|
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese
[Kim]
|
3386
|
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable
[Kim]
|
3387
|
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling
[Kim]
|
3388
|
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
[Kim]
|
3389
|
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
[Kim]
|
3391
|
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate
[Kim, by PG]
|
3390
|
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas?
[Kim]
|
3393
|
How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
[Kim]
|
3392
|
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
[Kim]
|
3394
|
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory
[Kim]
|
3396
|
Experiment requires mental causation
[Kim]
|
3397
|
Beliefs cause other beliefs
[Kim]
|
3399
|
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
[Kim]
|
3401
|
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
[Kim]
|
3403
|
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs
[Kim]
|
3402
|
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction
[Kim]
|
3406
|
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds
[Kim, by PG]
|
3407
|
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause
[Kim]
|
3408
|
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds
[Kim]
|
3409
|
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete
[Kim]
|
3410
|
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism
[Kim]
|
3411
|
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?
[Kim]
|
3412
|
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
[Kim]
|
3414
|
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?
[Kim]
|
3413
|
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
[Kim]
|
3416
|
Content may match several things in the environment
[Kim]
|
3417
|
Content depends on other content as well as the facts
[Kim]
|
3418
|
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
[Kim]
|
3419
|
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
[Kim]
|
3420
|
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour
[Kim]
|
3421
|
Content is best thought of as truth conditions
[Kim]
|
3422
|
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
[Kim]
|
3424
|
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
|
3426
|
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world
[Kim]
|
3427
|
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical
[Kim]
|
3428
|
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles
[Kim]
|
3430
|
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
[Kim]
|
3431
|
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty)
[Kim]
|
3432
|
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property?
[Kim]
|
3434
|
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things
[Kim]
|
3433
|
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
[Kim]
|
3436
|
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers?
[Kim]
|
3437
|
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan
[Kim]
|
3438
|
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
[Kim]
|
3439
|
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia
[Kim]
|
3440
|
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling
[Kim]
|
13746
|
Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation
[Kim]
|
13745
|
Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence
[Kim]
|
15456
|
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object
[Kim, by Lewis]
|