more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
An objection to the 'covariance' theory of content is that what you believe is influenced, often crucially, by what else you believe.
Gist of Idea
Content depends on other content as well as the facts
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.193)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.193
A Reaction
I can't think of a reply to this, if the covariance theory is suggesting that content just IS covariance of mental states with the environment. Externalism says that mind extends into the world.
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
| 6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
| 14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |