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Full Idea
No external factors seem to be required for Fred's belief that he is in pain, or that he exists, or that there are no unicorns.
Gist of Idea
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.198)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.198
A Reaction
This is an extremely important observation for anyone who was getting over-excited about external accounts of content. Unicorns might connect externally to horns and horses.
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
| 6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
| 14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |