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Single Idea 3422

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection ]

Full Idea

Externalism about content would have the consequence that most of our knowledge of our own intentional states is indirect and must be based on external evidence.

Gist of Idea

Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.207)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.207

A Reaction

I think this is a confusion, endemic in discussions of externalism. If what Shakespeare meant by 'water' is H2O, or Putnam means by 'elm' what experts say, the point is that their meanings are NOT part of their intentional states, which are bookmarks.

The 15 ideas with the same theme [learning about our minds by looking inwards]:

5676 To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
5687 For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
5688 Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
3467 Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
3483 Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
3422 Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
9328 All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
8831 Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
2967 We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
5692 Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
5670 Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]