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Single Idea 3433
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
]
Full Idea
From the emergentist point of view, the reductionists bridge laws are precisely what need to be explained. Why do these mental-physical correlations hold?
Gist of Idea
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.229
A Reaction
Everyone is happy with the bridge laws from chemistry to physics, but no one knows (deep down) why those exact laws hold. We need to understand what consciousness is; its cause will then, I think, become apparent.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[all mental events can be explained physically]:
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5713
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You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds?
[Lucretius]
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7550
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We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds
[Russell]
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9317
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Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
[Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
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3474
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If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
[Searle]
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3500
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Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
[Searle]
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6986
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Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?
[Jackson]
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3433
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The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
[Kim]
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4900
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Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
[Perry]
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3989
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I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything
[Lewis]
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7657
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Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines
[Dennett]
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7879
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Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
[Papineau]
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20971
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Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws
[Papineau]
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21834
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Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be
[Flanagan]
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10826
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'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism
[Field,H]
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6530
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We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose
[Lycan]
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6536
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Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws
[Lycan]
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7704
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Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual
[Jacquette]
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4597
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Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
[Heil]
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4903
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Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation
[Carter,R]
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4920
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Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex
[Carter,R]
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4688
|
We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination
[Lavers]
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8685
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Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them
[Friend]
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