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Full Idea
For the reductionist, no new causal powers emerge at higher levels, which goes against the claims of the emergentist and the non-reductive physicalist.
Gist of Idea
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.232
A Reaction
I would say that all higher level causes are simply the sums of lower level causes, as in chemistry and physics. What could possibly produced the power at the higher level, apart from the constituents of the thing? Magic?
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| 20816 | A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
| 22100 | Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson] |
| 6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
| 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
| 3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
| 7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
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| 2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |