more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 3444
[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
]
Full Idea
If the action is not caused by some other event, and it is not causeless, this leaves the possibility that it is caused by something else instead, and this something can only be the agent, the man.
Gist of Idea
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
Source
Roderick Chisholm (Human Freedom and the Self [1964], p.28)
Book Ref
'Free Will', ed/tr. Watson,Gary [OUP 1982], p.28
The
45 ideas
from Roderick Chisholm
9268
|
If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it?
[Frankfurt on Chisholm]
|
3442
|
Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused
[Chisholm]
|
3443
|
Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires?
[Chisholm]
|
3444
|
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
[Chisholm]
|
3445
|
Causation among objects relates either events or states
[Chisholm]
|
3446
|
For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs
[Chisholm]
|
20062
|
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong
[Chisholm]
|
20054
|
There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent
[Chisholm]
|
11965
|
Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa?
[Chisholm]
|
11966
|
If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are?
[Chisholm]
|
8790
|
The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying
[Chisholm]
|
15801
|
Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
[Chisholm]
|
15802
|
I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout
[Chisholm]
|
15803
|
Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process
[Chisholm]
|
15809
|
A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property
[Chisholm]
|
15804
|
If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
[Chisholm]
|
15805
|
Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity
[Chisholm]
|
15807
|
A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity
[Chisholm]
|
15808
|
A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics
[Chisholm]
|
15806
|
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
[Chisholm]
|
15811
|
I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'
[Chisholm]
|
15813
|
People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence
[Chisholm]
|
15810
|
Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves
[Chisholm]
|
15814
|
A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities
[Chisholm]
|
15815
|
Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent'
[Chisholm]
|
15819
|
Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter?
[Chisholm]
|
15816
|
'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book'
[Chisholm]
|
15818
|
So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them
[Chisholm]
|
15817
|
If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'?
[Chisholm]
|
15821
|
Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition
[Chisholm]
|
15820
|
A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary
[Chisholm]
|
15822
|
The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature
[Chisholm]
|
15823
|
Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation'
[Chisholm]
|
15824
|
There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission'
[Chisholm]
|
15826
|
There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
[Chisholm]
|
15827
|
Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had'
[Chisholm]
|
15828
|
I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs
[Chisholm]
|
15830
|
Some properties can never be had, like being a round square
[Chisholm]
|
15829
|
The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted
[Chisholm]
|
15831
|
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
[Chisholm]
|
15832
|
Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times
[Chisholm]
|
12852
|
If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists
[Chisholm, by Simons]
|
12851
|
Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks
[Chisholm, by Simons]
|
13120
|
Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states
[Chisholm, by Westerhoff]
|
19569
|
We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error
[Chisholm, by Kvanvig]
|