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Single Idea 3455
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
]
Full Idea
Property dualists (e.g. Nagel and McGinn) think that the mind-body problem is frightfully difficult, perhaps altogether insoluble.
Gist of Idea
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
Source
John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 1.I)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.2
A Reaction
Nagel's problem is that our concepts aren't up to it; McGinn's is that the very structure of our minds isn't up to it. My view is that the difficulty is the complexity we are up against, not the ontology.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is a non-reducible physical property]:
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5779
|
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
[Russell]
|
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2587
|
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
[Putnam]
|
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3405
|
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
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3966
|
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
[Davidson]
|
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3453
|
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
|
|
3455
|
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
|
|
3456
|
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
|
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3475
|
Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
|
|
3376
|
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
|
|
3424
|
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
|
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2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
|
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2985
|
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
[Lyons on Fodor]
|
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4070
|
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
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2406
|
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
|
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4593
|
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
|
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6622
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Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
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3520
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Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical
[Maslin]
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