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Single Idea 3462
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
]
Full Idea
We do not postulate beliefs and desires to account for anything; we simply experience conscious beliefs and desires.
Gist of Idea
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
Source
John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 2 App)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.59
A Reaction
Searle is too fond of reporting what we 'simply' know. Beliefs and desires are pushed forward by a cultural tradition. What I actually experience is a confusion, always laced with emotion.
The
61 ideas
from 'The Rediscovery of the Mind'
9317
|
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
[Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
|
3453
|
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
|
3450
|
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
[Searle]
|
3454
|
Reality is entirely particles in force fields
[Searle]
|
3451
|
Meaning is derived intentionality
[Searle]
|
3455
|
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
|
3456
|
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
|
3457
|
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
[Searle]
|
3458
|
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
[Searle]
|
3459
|
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit
[Searle]
|
3462
|
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
[Searle]
|
3461
|
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
[Searle]
|
3464
|
There is no such thing as 'wide content'
[Searle]
|
3463
|
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
[Searle]
|
3465
|
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
[Searle]
|
4088
|
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
[Searle]
|
3466
|
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
[Searle]
|
3467
|
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
[Searle]
|
3468
|
I cannot observe my own subjectivity
[Searle]
|
3470
|
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
[Searle]
|
3469
|
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
[Searle]
|
3471
|
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
[Searle]
|
3472
|
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
[Searle]
|
3473
|
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
[Searle]
|
3474
|
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
[Searle]
|
3475
|
Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
|
3478
|
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
[Searle]
|
3532
|
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient
[Maslin on Searle]
|
3533
|
Is supervenience just causality?
[Searle, by Maslin]
|
3477
|
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
[Searle]
|
3531
|
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
[Searle]
|
3476
|
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
[Searle]
|
3479
|
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
[Searle]
|
3480
|
We experience unity at an instant and across time
[Searle]
|
3481
|
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
[Searle]
|
3482
|
Perception is a function of expectation
[Searle]
|
3483
|
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
[Searle]
|
3484
|
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
[Searle]
|
3485
|
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
[Searle]
|
3486
|
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
[Searle]
|
3487
|
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
[Searle]
|
3489
|
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
[Searle]
|
3490
|
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
[Searle]
|
3491
|
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
[Searle]
|
3492
|
Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
|
3493
|
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
[Searle]
|
3494
|
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
[Searle]
|
3495
|
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
[Searle]
|
3496
|
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
[Searle]
|
3497
|
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
[Searle]
|
3498
|
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
[Searle]
|
3500
|
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
[Searle]
|
3499
|
Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
|
3501
|
If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
|
3502
|
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
[Searle]
|
3503
|
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
[Searle]
|
3504
|
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
[Searle]
|
3505
|
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
[Searle]
|
3506
|
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
[Searle]
|
3507
|
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
[Searle]
|
3508
|
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
[Searle]
|