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Single Idea 3476

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind ]

Full Idea

Mind is supervenient on brain in the following respect: type-identical neurophysiological causes have type-identical mentalistic effects.

Gist of Idea

Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect

Source

John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.V)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.124


A Reaction

An interesting statement of what might be meant by 'supervenience'. Searle's version implies necessity in the link (but not identity). I take him to imply that a zombie is impossible.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [total mapping of thoughts onto brain events]:

Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]