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Single Idea 3477
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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Full Idea
There are constitutive and causal notions of supervenience. Kim claims that mental events have no causal role, and merely supervene on brain events which do (which implies epiphenomenalism). But it seems obvious that mind is caused by brain.
Gist of Idea
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
Source
John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.V)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.125
A Reaction
Personally I think the whole discussion is doomed to confusion because it is riddled with a priori dualism. There is no all-or-nothing boundary between 'mind' and 'brain'. Kim's views have changed.
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[total mapping of thoughts onto brain events]:
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5018
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Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them
[Descartes]
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5924
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Identical objects must have identical value
[Ross]
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16041
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Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
[Davidson]
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3477
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If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
[Searle]
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3531
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Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
[Searle]
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3478
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Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
[Searle]
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3476
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Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
[Searle]
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2309
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Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
[Kim]
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2311
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Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
[Kim]
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3362
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Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
[Kim]
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3413
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Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
[Kim]
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3510
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Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism
[Papineau]
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3511
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Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects
[Papineau]
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2995
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Supervenience gives good support for mental causation
[Fodor]
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7865
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Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties
[Papineau]
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4080
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If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one
[Crane]
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2395
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Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience
[Chalmers]
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17277
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If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa)
[Fine,K]
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6158
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Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars
[Rowlands]
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