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Single Idea 3481

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories ]

Full Idea

I claim that only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious.

Clarification

Intentional states are those which have content, which are 'about' something

Gist of Idea

Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality

Source

John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6.I.5)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.132

A Reaction

The alternative to this is that robots and lower animals might have non-conscious states which are about something, because they process useful information but are unaware of it. If so, parts of the human mind might do the same, as in blindsight.

Related Idea

Idea 2978 Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]

The 23 ideas with the same theme [how can intentional states be explained?]:

6491 Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
18088 Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
2554 Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
3481 Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
3494 Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
2325 It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
3365 Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
2527 Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
3158 Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
7326 Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor]
15494 We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor]
2981 Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
3164 Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey]
6537 Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
2978 Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
2400 Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
7010 Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil]
7054 Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil]
4626 The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil]
4940 Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals [Edelman/Tononi]