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Single Idea 3483

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection ]

Full Idea

If by "introspection" we mean simply thinking about our own mental states, then there is no objection to introspection, but if we mean a special capacity like vision of looking inwards, there is no such capacity.

Gist of Idea

Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision

Source

John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6.II.2)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.144


A Reaction

This seems to beg the question of how we can be aware of our mental states in order to think about them. One might image that some animals have mental states, but are quite unaware that they have them, because they are totally focused on content.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [learning about our minds by looking inwards]:

To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]