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Single Idea 3496

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room ]

Full Idea

A computer, me for example, could run the steps in the program for some mental capacity, such as understanding Chinese, without understanding a word of Chinese.

Gist of Idea

A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese

Source

John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.II)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.200

A Reaction

I don't think this is true. I could recite a bit of Chinese without comprehension, but giving flexible answers to complex questions isn't plausible just by gormlessly implementing a procedure.

The 61 ideas from 'The Rediscovery of the Mind'

9317 Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
3451 Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
3453 Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
3454 Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
3450 Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
3455 Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
3456 Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
3457 Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
3458 Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
3459 You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]
3462 We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
3461 Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
3463 We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
3465 Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
3464 There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
4088 Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
3466 Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
3468 I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
3467 Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
3470 Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
3469 Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
3471 Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
3472 Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
3473 Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
3474 If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
3475 Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
3476 Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
3532 Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
3533 Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
3478 Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
3477 If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
3531 Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
3479 The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
3480 We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
3481 Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
3482 Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
3483 Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
3484 Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
3485 Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
3486 Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
3487 Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
3489 Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
3490 Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
3491 Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
3492 Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
3493 Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
3494 Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
3495 Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
3496 A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
3497 If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
3498 Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
3500 Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
3499 Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
3501 If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
3502 Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
3504 Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
3503 Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
3505 The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
3506 We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
3507 Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
3508 Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]