more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
In intentional explanations of behaviour patterns in the behaviour are explained by the fact that the agent has a representation of that very pattern in its intentional apparatus, which functions causally in the production of the behaviour.
Gist of Idea
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
Source
John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch.10.IV)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.240
A Reaction
Problem cases would be where someone's behaviour doesn't come out quite as planned (e.g. the sentence spoken failed to match the proposition intended), and panic behaviour.
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
| 6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
| 14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |