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Single Idea 3508
[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
]
Full Idea
It does not matter whether "true" does mean corresponds to the facts, because "corresponds to the facts" does mean corresponds to the facts, and any discipline that aims to describe how the world is aims for this correspondence.
Gist of Idea
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
Source
John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch.10.V)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.248
The
61 ideas
from 'The Rediscovery of the Mind'
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9317
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Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
[Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
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3453
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Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
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3450
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Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
[Searle]
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3454
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Reality is entirely particles in force fields
[Searle]
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3451
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Meaning is derived intentionality
[Searle]
|
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3455
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Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
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3456
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Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
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3457
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Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
[Searle]
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3458
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Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
[Searle]
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3459
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You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit
[Searle]
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3462
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We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
[Searle]
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3461
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Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
[Searle]
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3464
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There is no such thing as 'wide content'
[Searle]
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3463
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We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
[Searle]
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3465
|
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
[Searle]
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4088
|
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
[Searle]
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3466
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Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
[Searle]
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3467
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Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
[Searle]
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3468
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I cannot observe my own subjectivity
[Searle]
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3470
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Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
[Searle]
|
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3469
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Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
[Searle]
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3471
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Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
[Searle]
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3472
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Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
[Searle]
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3473
|
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
[Searle]
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3474
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If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
[Searle]
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3475
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Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
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3478
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Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
[Searle]
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3532
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Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient
[Maslin on Searle]
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3533
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Is supervenience just causality?
[Searle, by Maslin]
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3477
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If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
[Searle]
|
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3531
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Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
[Searle]
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3476
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Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
[Searle]
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3479
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The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
[Searle]
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3480
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We experience unity at an instant and across time
[Searle]
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3481
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Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
[Searle]
|
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3482
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Perception is a function of expectation
[Searle]
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3483
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Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
[Searle]
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3484
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Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
[Searle]
|
|
3485
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Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
[Searle]
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3486
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Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
[Searle]
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3487
|
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
[Searle]
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3489
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Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
[Searle]
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3490
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Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
[Searle]
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3491
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Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
[Searle]
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3492
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Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
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3493
|
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
[Searle]
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3494
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Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
[Searle]
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3495
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Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
[Searle]
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3496
|
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
[Searle]
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3497
|
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
[Searle]
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3498
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Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
[Searle]
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3500
|
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
[Searle]
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3499
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Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
|
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3501
|
If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
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3502
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Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
[Searle]
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3503
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Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
[Searle]
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3504
|
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
[Searle]
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3505
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The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
[Searle]
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3506
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We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
[Searle]
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3507
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Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
[Searle]
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3508
|
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
[Searle]
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