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Full Idea
The argument for supervenience rests on the principle that any mental difference must be capable of showing itself in differential physical consequences.
Gist of Idea
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects
Source
David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 1.8)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.28
A Reaction
With our current knowledge of the brain, to assume anything less than this sort of correlation would be crazy.
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |