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Full Idea
If functionalism implies that there is nothing physically in common among the realisations of a given mental state, then there is no possibility of any uniform explanation of why they all give rise to a common physical result.
Gist of Idea
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour?
Source
David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 2.2)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.35
A Reaction
This is the well known interaction problem for dualism. The standard reply is to accept interaction as a given (with no apparent explanation). A miracle, if you like.
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |