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Full Idea
Even dualists must explain how the mind represents things, but then their mind-stuff has so many special powers already (being outside space but in time, being transparent to itself etc.) that one more scarcely seems worth worrying about.
Gist of Idea
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself?
Source
David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 3.1 n1)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.55
A Reaction
I share the exasperation. It is hard to see how a dualist could even begin to formulate a theory about HOW the mind does so many different things. Could Descartes get a research grant for it? Would we understand God if he tried to explain it to us?
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |