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Full Idea
The functionalist approach to the mind needs to invoke assumptions about what desires are for and beliefs are about, in order to infer what agents will do.
Gist of Idea
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
Source
David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 3.2)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.57
A Reaction
Isn't the idea that you discover what desires are for and what beliefs are about by examining their function, and what the agent does? Which end should we start?
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |