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Full Idea
Physicalism does not deny that there are conscious experiences, nor that 'it is like something to have them'. The claim is only that this is nothing different from what it is to be a physical system of the relevant kind.
Gist of Idea
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing
Source
David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 4.2)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.106
A Reaction
The implication is that no physicalist is an extreme eliminativist about consciousness, which seems to be correct. We all concede that weather exists, but have a reductive view of it. The key question is whether mind is reducible to physics.
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |