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Single Idea 3520
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
]
Full Idea
In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states.
Gist of Idea
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical
Source
Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6)
Book Ref
Maslin,Keith: 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [Polity 2001], p.93
A Reaction
Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834.
Related Idea
Idea 4834
Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is a non-reducible physical property]:
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5779
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There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
[Russell]
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2587
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Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
[Putnam]
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3405
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If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
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3966
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The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
[Davidson]
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3453
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Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
|
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3455
|
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
|
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3456
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Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
|
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3475
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Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
|
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3376
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We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
|
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3424
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Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
|
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2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
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2985
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Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
[Lyons on Fodor]
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4070
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Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
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2406
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H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
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4593
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'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
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6622
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Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
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3520
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Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical
[Maslin]
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