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Full Idea
In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states.
Gist of Idea
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical
Source
Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6)
Book Ref
Maslin,Keith: 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [Polity 2001], p.93
A Reaction
Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834.
Related Idea
Idea 4834 Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
| 3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
| 3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
| 3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
| 3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
| 3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
| 3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
| 3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
| 3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |