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Single Idea 3526

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata ]

Full Idea

Davidson says causal explanations hold between descriptions of events and not between the events themselves, so the possibility of events as explanations depends on how they are described (e.g. a wind collapsing a bridge).

Gist of Idea

Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described

Source

report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4

Book Ref

Maslin,Keith: 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [Polity 2001], p.198

The 13 ideas from 'Mental Events'

3529 Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
2307 Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
5497 Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
4081 Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
2321 If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
3404 Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
3429 Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
6620 Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
16041 Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
4983 There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]