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Single Idea 3526
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
Davidson says causal explanations hold between descriptions of events and not between the events themselves, so the possibility of events as explanations depends on how they are described (e.g. a wind collapsing a bridge).
Gist of Idea
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4
Book Ref
Maslin,Keith: 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [Polity 2001], p.198
The
13 ideas
from 'Mental Events'
3529
|
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
2307
|
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
5497
|
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative
[Davidson, by Lycan]
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4081
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Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties
[Davidson, by Crane]
|
2321
|
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible?
[Davidson, by Kim]
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3404
|
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3405
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If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
6620
|
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation
[Davidson, by Lowe]
|
3429
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Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
[Davidson, by Kim]
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3524
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Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events
[Davidson, by Maslin]
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3526
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Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
16041
|
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
[Davidson]
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4983
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There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene
[Davidson]
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