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Full Idea
Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics.
Gist of Idea
If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic
Source
Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6)
Book Ref
Annas,Julia: 'The Morality of Happiness' [OUP 1995], p.115
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |