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Single Idea 3566
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
]
Full Idea
We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire.
Gist of Idea
We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.26
The
29 ideas
from 'Problems of Knowledge'
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
[Williams,M]
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
[Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
[Williams,M]
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
[Williams,M]
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
[Williams,M]
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
[Williams,M]
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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3587
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Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
[Williams,M]
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
[Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
[Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
[Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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3591
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We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
[Williams,M]
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
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3592
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Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories
[Williams,M]
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
[Williams,M]
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
[Williams,M]
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