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Single Idea 3567
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
]
Full Idea
It is not clear what would even be meant by supposing that there are causal relations to mathematical facts.
Gist of Idea
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.30
A Reaction
I agree, though platonists seem to be willing to entertain the possibility that there are causal relations, for which no further explanation can be given. Better is knowledge without a causal relation.
The
34 ideas
from Michael Williams
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8849
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Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist
[Williams,M]
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8851
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Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification
[Williams,M]
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8852
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In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option
[Williams,M]
|
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8853
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Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
[Williams,M]
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8855
|
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed
[Williams,M]
|
|
3564
|
Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
[Williams,M]
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3573
|
Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
[Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
[Williams,M]
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
[Williams,M]
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
[Williams,M]
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
[Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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3587
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Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
[Williams,M]
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3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
[Williams,M]
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
[Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
[Williams,M]
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3591
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We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
[Williams,M]
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3592
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Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
[Williams,M]
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories
[Williams,M]
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
[Williams,M]
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